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RECENT BOOKS
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER. The Struggle for Human Rights
in the United Nations. By Moses Moskowitz. New York: Oceana Publications. 1958. Pp. 239. $3.95.
This is a valuable addition to the vast literature on questions of the
international protection of human rights which has appeared since World
War II. It is interesting to the student who is familiar with the subject.
It is also a very good introduction to what has become a very involved
accumulation of law and fact.
In describing the human rights activities of the United Nations the
author deals with the Charter and with the ambitious project of the
International Bill of Human Rights, of which only the first part, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, has so far materialized.
However, the United Nations has met considerable difficulties of a political
and technical nature in making rapid progress with what was supposed to
be the core of the bill, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Mr. Moskowitz
estimates that the General Assembly will require at least ten more years
before the covenants can be opened for signature. The book gives an
account of two outstanding examples of United Nations intervention in
specific human rights issues, namely, the racial situation in South Africa
and the issue of forced labor. It also deals with interim measures for the
· protection of human rights and supplementary programs, in particular, in
the latter category, with the so-called action program proposed by the
United States which consists of advisory services in human rights, a system
of periodic reports by governments, and studies of specific rights or groups
of rights.
The author believes that the basic considerations underlying the human
rights program are political, social and moral, and only secondarily legal
and constitutional. The fact remains, he adds, that the systematic development of well defined and reliable procedures and practices which are
indispensable to orderly international action for the advancement of
human rights requires a clear and authoritative answer to the many
constitutional problems which arise out of the domestic jurisdiction
clause [Article 2 (7) of the Charter]. The failure of the United Nations to
provide such an answer is, in the author's view, both cause and effect which
account for the fact that ~o far the world organization has not succeeded
in striking a balance between the appropriate spheres of national and
international competence in the field of human rights.
Moskowitz makes a strong plea for the right of the individual to
petition an international authority and for the creation of the office of a
United Nations Attorney-General for human rights. His suggestions contemplate a world-wide network of regional machineries of implementation
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(committees and regional attorneys-general) from which an appeal would
lie to the Central Human Rights Committee.
A book like Human Rights and World Order, the author of which has
for many years devoted his scholastic attainments and his great industry
to the cause of human rights, deserves not that the review be restricted
to a few general laudatory remarks, but that the issues which it presents
be squarely faced and subjected to critical analysis. This will now be
attempted.
The main conclusion of the book is summarized in one short sentence on
page 166, where the author states that "there is no substitute for the
Covenants on Human Rights." In this refined and reflective age, he believes,
moral indignation is no barrier to mischief; "but a government will reflect
twice before risking a breach of international law." Nobody who is interested in the international protection of human rights will seriously contest
the view that the coming into force of comprehensive legally binding
treaties regulating all fields and all aspects of human rights and endowed
with appropriate international supervisory machinery would be a highly
desirable state of affairs. This is, indeed, a goal to which the United Nations
is solemnly committed. The author underestimates, however, what already
exists and declines to accept less complete achievements as desirable assets.
His point of departure is an interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction
clause of the Charter which is indistinguishable from the interpretation
placed on this often quoted clause by the champions of unrestricted State
sovereignty. That Moskowitz makes a brilliant plea, de lege ferenda, for the
need for an "international rule of law in Human Rights" does not alter
the fact that it is his proposition that the lex lata places no obligations in
human rights matters on States and that, apart from cases which involve
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, it vests no
authority in the United Nations. He states that "the Member States are
partially liable to the jurisdiction of the United Nations in so far as they
are subject to its enforcement authority in situations and disputes which
the United Nations considers as requiring its intervention," i.e., by way of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. That in his view
is the limit of the obligations deriving from acceptance of the Charter.
So blunt a statement does not take sufficiently into account the fact that
Member States have pledged themselves to take action for the achievement
of universal respect for human rights (Article 56) and to fulfill in good
faith the obligations assumed by them [Article 2 (2)].
It is a consequence flowing logically from the author's general approach
when he says, with regard to the action taken in such matters as the race
question in South Africa and the question of forced labor, that these
"demonstrate clearly the illusory character of United Nations intervention
in specific questions involving human rights and its incapacity for effective
and constructive action." While it cannot be claimed that the activities
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of the Organization in regard to the racial situation in South Africa have
so far been crowned with success, there will be many who dissent from his
summary dismissal of the many similar attempts of the Organization. That
"the United Nations fell far short of its objectives" is not surprising.
Mr. Hammarskjold has said: "The United Nations is only a first approximation to the world order which we need and which one day must be
brought about." (Address at the Atoms for Peace Award Ceremony, January
29, 1959)
Moskowitz dismisses lightly such developments as the use of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a yardstick for human rights standards
by the United Nations organs and other inter-governmental organizations;
the implementation of a series of provisions of the Declaration in special
conventions which have come into force under the auspices of the United
Nations, of the International Labour Organisation and of the Council of
Europe; the incorporation of the Universal Declaration in a number of
international conventions and other instruments; the influence of the
Declaration upon national constitutions and legislation. He hardly does
justice to such developments as the evolution of international procedures
and the growth of customary rules and principles which have emerged from
the "allegations procedure" which was established by the International
Labour Organisation on behalf of the United Nations and on its own behalf. [See Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom.]
This development took place, not on the basis of international conventions,
but by making use of the powers inherent in the United Nations and in the
International Labour Organisation under their basic instruments. The
"allegations procedure" has, in scope and in weight, by far overtaken the
importance of the more formal procedures of representation and complaint
which are provided in the Constitution of the ILO.
The author gives little, if any, credit to the impact on national and
international developments of the studies and recommendations in the
field of the status of women. He prematurely dismisses the importance of
the "new directions in the United Nations programme" on human rights
[See Humphrey in New York Law Forum, October 1958.] which are still
in their initial stages. Their potentialities cannot yet be conclusively estimated. Moskowitz does not deny that the advisory services, more particularly in the form of seminars, or regional conferences, devoted to such
questions as the protection of human rights in criminal law and procedure,
hold out promise. This reviewer cannot agree with the conclusion that the
studies (or the one study undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights,
on "the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and
exile" which is still in a preparatory stage) "fail to come to grips with the
facts of the situation or tend to dilute the concrete and specific in a sea
of generalities"; nor with the opinion that the studies of discrimination
in various areas such as education or political rights, undertaken by the
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Sub-Commission on -Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Min.orities, a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights, stand out
in sharp contrast to the arbitrary arrest study undertaken by the Commission itself through a committee of four of its members.
In general, Moskowitz perhaps overestimates the difference, in the international community as it exists today, between treaties purporting to be
legally enforceable and pronouncements or activities which operate in the
moral and political rather than in the legal field. The 1947 Peace Treaties
are international instruments which contain not only legally binding proYisions to secure the enjoyment of human rights in the States concerned,
but also provide for international machinery for the settlement of disputes
·arising out of their interpretation and execution. Nevertheless, in some
cases, the machinery of the Peace Treaties broke down. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, on the other hand, which is not a treaty,
which was not the object of signature and ratification and which does
not provide for its international implementation has, in the words of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, "acquired an authority of growing importance."
Side by side with his rather dogmatic approach to Article 2 (7) of the
Charter, and perhaps not quite consistently with it, Moskowitz expresses
the opinion that whether a matter is or is not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is not necessarily a legal question. It depends,
he believes, upon the state of international relations at a particular time.
The concept of "international relations" as denoting an academic discipline different from "international law" has come into use only in recent
years. The Permanent Court of International Justice did not use the term
"international relations" as opposed to "international law" when in the
Advisory Opinion concerning the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees,
1923, Series B, No. 4, page 24, to which Moskowitz refers, it said that the
"question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction
of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations." The Court continued: "Thus, in the
present state of international law (sic!), questions of -nationality are ... in
principle within this reserved domain." It remains a question of law-to
which, incidentally, the General Assembly has given an unmistakable
negative reply in a long series of decisions adopted, albeit, by differently
composed majorities-whether in spite of the Charter provisions on human
rights, human rights questions have remained a matter which is essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of States. An "authoritative interpretation"
of the terms of Article 2 (7), which the author so keenly desires, could be
obtained only through the procedure of an amendment to the Charter.
"The right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs
· solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it."
"Ejus est interpretare legem cujus condere" [Question of Jaworzina (Polish-
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Czechoslovakian frontier), Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, 6 December 1923, Series B, No. 8, page 37]. An
amendment of the Charter on so delicate a problem as domestic jurisdiction is beyond the realm of practicability. This is shown by the difficulties
which arose in 1956, 1957 and 1958 in connection with the far less sensitive
proposals to amend the Charter provisions about the number of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council and of the members of the
Economic and Social Council.
If this reviewer has expressed opinions which differ in some respect
from those of Mr. Moskowitz, or if he has placed different emphasis on
various developments, this does not mean that he finds himself in disagreement with the main body of the book, and still less that this difference
of opinion detracts from the scientific value and scholarly character of Mr.
Moskowitz' contribution. The difference is more a difference of temperaments. In the international field in general and in human rights in particular this reviewer accepts Marcus Aurelius' advice: " ... be content with
achieving even slight progress in human affairs and do not consider even
slight progress unimportant."
Egon Schwelb•

• Deputy Director, Division of Human Rights, United Nations. The views expressed
in this review are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion
of the United Nations Secretariat.

